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‘The changing face of responsibility: 
An overtime comparison of French social-democratic governments’1 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the changing face of governmental responsibility through a 
comparative content analysis of the yearly budgetary presentations of the French ministers of 
economy and finance. The cases analyzed are the governments under the Hollande (2012-
2017) and first Mitterrand 1981-1986) presidencies. In both cases there were strong external 
pressures that hindered the pursuit of expansionary budgetary policies and that forced the 
executives to pursue more restrictive measures. The analysis consists in a comparison of how 
the ministers in the two different time-periods justified this policy course, hypothesizing that 
international institutional constraints played a more prominent role during the Hollande than 
during the Mitterrand presidency. By distinguishing between responsive and responsible 
justifications, we find that institutional constraints are indeed more prominent in the 
justifications provided by contemporary ministers. These findings have important 
repercussions for our understanding how the national democratic cycle functions under the 
conditions of European integration. In particular, they indicate that the accountability stage 
results to be significantly altered, as governments do no longer take full credit for their 
measures, but rather present themselves as spokespersons for a web of institutions. These 
findings, we argue, are likely not to be peculiar to France but rather relate to a general trend in 
European politics. 
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1. Introduction 
Peter Mair’s (2013; 2014) theory about the increasing role of governmental responsibility versus 
partisan responsiveness derives from his lifelong research on the organizational developments of 
political parties throughout the twentieth century. The implications of his theory, however, go well 
beyond the party-politics literature and speak to one of the main questions in contemporary 
political science. After the ‘Golden age’ of party-politics (Mair 2008) and the period of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982), nation-states seem to have lost parts of their political authority 
(Genschel & Zangl 2014) and the role of political parties – as vehicles for collective decision-
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making – seems to have withered (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In this new setting, it becomes 
questionable whether – and to what extent – the socio-economic policies of contemporary 
governments follow from the political programmes of the governing parties, or whether they are 
dictated by the rules set by international and supranational organizations like the EU or the IMF.  
Testing this proposition requires a cross-time comparative approach, particularly when conceiving 
the issue in the terms that Mair proposes.  His argument is that governments today have become 
more responsible and less responsive than in the past, and that this development, in turn, is 
affecting electoral competition (see Introduction of the present issue). As this argument outlines a 
long causal chain that connects EU-supranational decision-making to the relation between political 
parties and their voters – as Mair himself also recognizes (2014) – the implications of those 
mechanisms may not yet be clearly visible. This is illustrated by the fact that existing large-N 
longitudinal studies have found ambiguous results regarding the changes hypothesized by Mair 
(e.g. Potrafke 2009; Adams et al 2009; Dalton et al 2011). Therefore, we propose a qualitative 
research strategy that – rather than looking for patterns across diverse cases – tries to map overtime 
differences across most similar cases and in most similar situations. Following these criteria, we 
propose to compare governments of similar partisan composition facing adverse economic 
conditions, focusing the analysis on the political considerations behind the drafting of the yearly 
budgets.  
The recent presidency of François Hollande and the governments of the first presidential mandate 
of François Mitterrand offer a very interesting opportunity for such a comparison. These two 
presidencies share the similarity of featuring a Parti Socialiste-dominated cabinet facing adverse 
economic circumstances, which strongly hindered the realization of the governing party’s electoral 
programme. The difficult economic conditions and the progressive-oriented electoral programs 
offer the opportunity to compare governments facing a tension between responsiveness and 
responsibility under different levels of international economic and European integration.  
France, in fact, as one of the founding members of the European Union, is one of the more strongly 
involved countries in the process of European integration, which after the Maastricht Treaty grew 
not only in economic terms, but also politically and institutionally (Smith 2006). At the same time, 
however, some of the country’s domestic socio-economic characteristics have partially hindered 
its adaptation to certain European guidelines – such as in the case of the modernization of the 
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system of social protection – creating thereby a tension between European and domestic politics 
(Caune et al 2011). With a comparative study of these French social-democratic executives, it is 
thus possible to make a descriptive inference of the overtime changes in the system commonly 
known as party-government. 
Following up on a study on the changing responsiveness of the French Parti Socialiste (Damhuis 
and Karremans 2017), this paper investigates how the French governments under the two 
presidencies profiled themselves as ‘responsible’. The paper thereby provides a comparative 
insight into how the ‘responsible’ side of policy-making today is different from the past. It shows 
that while under Mitterrand governments took full credit for their policies of budgetary rigor, under 
Hollande the blame is shifted to the European commitments to which the executive is expected to 
abide. This overtime difference, we argue, may have considerable implications for the relationship 
between parties and their voters.  
The paper is structured as follows. We first discuss the theoretical framework on which our 
analysis is based, together with an overview of institutional constraints to budgetary policy-making 
in France between the 1980s and today. We then proceed by describing our methodology for 
analysing the justification arguments. Subsequently, we present the results of our comparative 
content analysis and provide evidence of the qualitative differences between governmental 
responsibilities in the two time-periods under study, reflecting on how these change the 
relationships between governments, parliaments and voters. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework: Distinguishing responsibility from responsiveness 
The theoretical starting point of our comparative study is that government action in western 
democracies is always guided by both responsive and responsible policy criteria. Following Sartori 
(1976), we consider the balance between these criteria to be the very essence of the legitimacy of 
party-government. From this perspective, responsiveness relates to political parties’ representative 
function, whereas responsibility is linked to the duties concerning the task of governing. 
Consequently, we conceive responsiveness as the chain through which parties connect the 
preferences of their voters to policy outputs (Powell 2004). Responsibility, instead, concerns the 
institutional norms and procedures to which executives must abide. Accordingly, when it comes 
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to drafting the yearly budget, this means to comply with the rules regarding public deficits or to 
meet the obligations towards creditors. 
As Mair’s argument is based on the idea that contemporary institutional constraints are rendering 
the partisan composition of government irrelevant, we try to draw a borderline between the 
ideological identity of the governing parties on the one hand and the institutional continuity of 
governments on the other. From our perspective, the distinction between the two notions is 
strongly related to the distinctive programmatic characteristics of the governing party: what do 
party-voters expect from their representatives in office versus what is expected from governments 
disregarding of the party in office (see also: Damhuis and Karremans 2017; Karremans 2017). 
Accordingly, responsiveness characterizes the political colour of the government, whereas 
responsibility reflects the institutional setting in which a cabinet operates. To some extent, our 
distinction can be understood as a borderline between what a cabinet wants and what it ought to 
do, as there is not only an agenda it intends to pursue, but there are also rules and constraints to 
which it is expected to comply. 
Whereas responsiveness is strongly related to the party operating in office, responsibility is more 
related to the rules concerning a particular policy field. When analysing the justifications for the 
yearly budgets, we thus consider responsible justifications to be those arguments that explain how 
the government’s decision respects the institutional commitment to preserve sustainable public 
finances. Following the idea that the process of European integration has provided governments 
with a growing amount of institutional commitments in this regard, our expectation is that these 
type of justifications today are more prominent than in the past. 
 
Institutional constraints in France between the 1980s and 2010s 
As most other West-European countries, during the 1980s and 1990s, France transformed from an 
industrial into a post-industrial economy (Boix 2015). In parallel, while national governments 
aimed at steering the economy in the industrial era, their function in the post-industrial world 
became mainly to support markets and to create the right conditions for enterprises to compete in 
the global economy (Jessop 2007: 209-222). Consequently, national politicians have lost important 
5 
 
sets of economic policy instruments, and their influence on public policy has been considerably 
replaced by European and global actors (Cole 2008: 200).  
Constraints to the government’s sphere of action, however, also existed prior to the transition to a 
more service-based economy. Even in the years of the so-called dirigisme – during which 
governments would have five-year plans for the economy (Culpepper et al 2006) – the hands of 
French executives were regularly tied by constraining constitutional norms (Stone 1989). The 
power of the Constitutional Court, in particular, ranged – and still ranges – from general to 
particular policy issues, which regularly affects the final shape of legislation. As every policy-
making decision can be subject to the court’s scrutiny, governments need to be keen in complying 
with the constitutional requirements behind their action.  
The establishment of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979, in turn, put 
considerable pressure on French executives to reduce the rate of inflation in order to reduce trade 
deficits and restore competitiveness. Even if it could be argued that there were other alternatives 
(Cameron 1996), the fiscal and monetary contractions adopted since 1983 were strongly related to 
the Thatcherite ideas about creating the conditions for economic growth with such measures 
(Gourevitch 1986). On top of that, the end of growth in the global economy of the 1970s rendered 
Keynesian policy strategies much less viable, making it particularly difficult for the political left 
to implement its traditional socio-economic programmes (Hall 1994).  
The tension between a socialist policy programme and the pressures stemming from the 
international political economy thus already existed at the dawn of the post-industrial era. What 
has changed between the 1980s and 2010s, however, is the level of institutionalization of such 
pressures (Dorrucci et al 2015). Figure 1 reports the level of France’s institutional integration in 
the EU between the 1980s and the 2000s, as indexed by Dorrucci et al (2015).  
[   Figure 1 about here   ] 
 
 
With the various spill-over effects and the growth in competencies (Dinan 2010), the EU has 
become more than an abstract constraint for national policy-makers, but a concrete set of rules that 
considerably shapes what politicians consider to be appropriate action, both in practical and in 
legal terms (Smith 2006). Together with the embedment in other international organizations, these 
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developments have considerably changed the role of national states, as they are no longer the sole 
actors detaining political authority. Instead, they share the latter with other inter- and supranational 
actors (Genschel and Zangl 2014). 
At the same time, national policy legacies too have a considerable constraining effect on the 
government’s action. The accumulation of French national public debt (in % of GDP) in particular 
– which rose from around 20% in the 1980s to over 90% in the 2010s (see Figure 2) – considerably 
reduces the scope for discretionary spending in most OECD countries (Streeck and Mertens 2013). 
The public money invested in the rescuing of private banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis strongly accelerated this process (Schäfer and Streeck 2013). Consequently, the efforts 
undertaken at the European level since 2010 to reduce national public deficits represent an 
important further step in the growing influence of European rules in national policy-making, 
increasingly inducing governments to pursue contracting rather than expansive fiscal policies 
(Laffan 2014). 
[  Figure 2 about here  ] 
This growth of institutional constraints – both at the national level and at the international level – 
has led Peter Mair to theorize that parties ‘have moved away from representing the interests of the 
citizens to the state to representing interests of the state to the citizens’ (Mair 2014: 582). Following 
this statement, we expect the over-time difference in institutional constraints to have observable 
implications in justifications for annual budgets.  
[  Figure 3 about here  ] 
The redistribution of state resources – and by extension, as we will argue below, of social-
democratic vis-à-vis institutional discourse – is also largely dependent on the levels of economic 
growth, which may increase or reduce the possibilities for governments to spend. This makes 
overtime comparison particularly difficult.  Our case selection reduces this problem, as under both 
presidencies France had relatively similar levels of economic growth (Figure 3). Under these 
circumstances, thus, we expect the discourses of the Hollande governments – when compared to 
those of the Mitterrand governments – to feature more references of state commitments rather than 
to social-democratic policy goals.  
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3. The analysis of budget speeches 
Justifications as unit of analysis 
The analysis of justification arguments allows to focus on a stage of the democratic process that 
has been left largely unexplored in the party-politics literature. The system commonly known as 
party-government has been mostly conceived as a circular process running from citizens’ 
preferences to policy-outputs and then from public policy back to citizens’ preferences (Kriesi et 
al 2013: 58; Dalton et al 2011). Political parties are the dominant actors at each stage of this 
process, as they not only make sure that voters’ preferences are represented at the policy-making 
stage, but they also provide information to the voters about their actions in office. While the first 
half of the process has extensively been examined in the party-politics literature, the second half 
is less well understood, in particular with respect to  the responsive-responsible dilemma. It is in 
these parts of the democratic cycle, however, that it becomes particularly interesting to test Mair’s 
hypothesis. 
By studying the stage of the democratic cycle during which policy information starts to flow back 
from the institutional arena to the public, it is possible to obtain a more direct insight into how the 
partisan character of government relates to its institutional duties: when justifying their actions in 
government, politicians are no longer only representatives of particular sets of political 
preferences, but they also speak on behalf of a national institution. From the perspective of the 
party-model of representative democracy (e.g. Katz 2014; Rose 2014), such justifications should 
feature a certain share of arguments stemming from the politician’s partisan affiliation and a certain 
share of arguments stemming from its institutional responsibilities. If the argument about the 
growing amount of institutional constraints is correct, we would expect that contemporary 
governments would feature a larger share of responsible justifications than governments from the 
past. In order to make such a comparison, however, it is necessary not only to identify comparable 
cases, but also to identify comparable speeches or texts. 
Our analysis therefore focuses on the arguments with which governments justify their budgetary 
measures in front of the parliament. Budget speeches lend themselves very well for overtime 
comparisons as they are formal yearly recurrences that keep many factors constant. In France, the 
budget speeches are given each year in October by the minister of economy and finance in the 
Assemblée Générale. With our analysis, we compare the budget speeches held under the Hollande 
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presidency (2012-2017) with the budget speeches presented during the first office term of François 
Mitterrand when PS-dominated governments were in power (1981-1986). 2 
As the budget is presented in front of the whole parliament, the minister needs to address both the 
majority supporting the government as well as the opposition. Furthermore, as the policies 
presented have potential repercussions for all sections of society – as well as for external actors, 
such as international financial markets or foreign governments – the minister’s speech is likely to 
be picked up by a very broad audience, ranging from pensioners to international creditors. In such 
scenarios, the partisan and the institutional character of the minister are most likely to stand side 
by side. Through an overtime comparison, we can thus see how the balance and interaction 
between these two aspects of party-government have changed. 
Our analysis focuses entirely on the explanations for government’s measures. In contrast to other 
studies of governments’ discourse, such as the work clustered around the Comparative Agendas 
Project (e.g. Green-Pedersen & Walgrave 2014), we do not analyse the full body of text, but only 
code those passages that are directly linked to actual policies or policy packages. For instance, in 
the following excerpt from the 2012 budget speech, we observe the references to the government’s 
policy/action (the underlined text), and the explanation/justification for it (the text in bold): 
 
- We understand companies. We want to help those who create, who innovate and export, 
because it is in companies that wealth and employment are created. That is the aim of our 
action. […] We therefore propose to put into place a tax status for entrepreneurs, to encourage 
long-term investment in order to better take into account the situation of those who reinvest in a 
new company the added value they have generated on the sale of the company they ran until then. 
(Pierre Moscovici, 16 October 2012) 
 
The passages in bold inform us that the government’s action is directed towards companies that 
create innovation and employment, and that new tax status for entrepreneurs will encourage long-
term investment. By listing these references, we created an overview of the criteria used by the 
governments to explain their actions. With this method, we gathered 940 justifications (464 for the 
Mitterrand governments and 476 for the Hollande governments) and we inductively grouped these 
                                                          
2 All budget speeches can be found on the official website of the French Assembly. See: http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/7/cri/ 
for the Mitterrand governments, and http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/debats/ for the Hollande governments (as viewed on 
November 2, 2017) 
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into 79 categories, which we list in the Appendix. By grouping the references, it is possible to 
distinguish between more partisan and more institutional justifications. 
The proximity between justification and actual policy – together with the institutional context in 
which the speech is given – constitutes the core component for the methodological soundness of 
our analysis. When speaking in institutional contexts, in fact, policy-makers are expected to act 
consistently with their actions (Van der Veen 2011: 31). On top of that, by controlling for 
association between the policy-types that are being referred and their justifications, we show that 
there is a considerable consistency between justifications and government’s actions. In fact, the 
policies presented in the budget speech can be subdivided in expansive and restrictive measures, 
which respectively increase and reduce the levels of public and expenditure and taxation. At the 
same time, the minister may also refer to policy packages including both type of measures or to 
regulatory policies. In these cases we classify the policies as general. Our expectation is that 
responsive justifications are more associated with expansive measures (increases in expenditure 
and taxation), whereas responsible justifications are more associated with restrictive measures (tax 
and expenditure cuts).  
 
Responsive vs Responsible justifications 
The list of justification categories can be aggregated into different levels of broader groups. 
Overall, in fact, we find that all justifications refer to three broad categories: society, economy and 
public finance. The former (rows 1.1-1.31 in the Appendix) constitute the justifications that we 
label ‘responsive’. These have been extensively examined in our previous study (Damhuis and 
Karremans 2017), wherein we identified significant overtime changes in the representativeness of 
the Parti Socialiste, which are largely in line with the programmatic transformation of various 
European social-democratic between the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Kitschelt 1994; Green Pedersen & 
Van Kersbergen 2002). 
The shared characteristic of the various ‘responsive’ justifications is that they are related to the 
egalitarian goals of the party, with the overtime difference that in the 1980s the focus was more on 
redistributing wealth from high to low income groups, whereas today the party is more committed 
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towards maintaining social harmony. The following two passages are examples of the PS’s 
responsiveness in respectively 1981 and in 2016: 
- A considerable fortune, no one can deny, confers a particular contributory faculty. This is the 
first reason for which it is legitimate to impose taxes on large fortunes. Such taxation is also 
justified by the need to correct inequalities, which are superior in terms of assets to those 
already considerable in terms of income. (Laurent Fabius, 27 October 1981) 
- The 2017 budget will also make 3 additional billion euro available for schools and higher 
education. Thanks to our action since 2012, the school system of the Republic is once again able 
to educate our fellow citizens in the changes of today’s and tomorrow’s world, and to play its 
emancipatory role so that everyone, whatever one’s social origin, can fully participate in public 
life. (Michel Sapin, 18 October 2016) 
These justifications reveal the partisan aspect of party-government, as the minister profiles the 
action of the executive according to certain ideological preferences: in the 1980s it was economic 
redistribution and today it tends to be more focused on social investment. In this paper, however, 
we wish to zoom into the institutional side of the same ministers and the same discourses.  
Before being party-members, the ministers are first of all spokespersons of a national institution 
when presenting the yearly financial budget. The largest shares of their discourse are therefore not 
dedicated to the commitments they have towards their voters, but rather to the responsibilities they 
have towards the whole nation. Consequently, the economic developments and the performance 
of the country in terms of growth or employment occupy the larger share of the discourse. At the 
same time, the minister also needs to refer to the state of the public finances and the institutional 
rules to which the government is expected to comply. 
While the partisan and institutional character of the government may easily be blurred in the 
justifications referring to the economy, this applies less to the arguments about public deficits or 
institutional rules. In the arguments about the economy (Appendix: rows 2.1-2.29), in fact, a social-
democratic government may propose its partisan preferences and present them as responsible. 
Stimulating economic growth, for instance, may be beneficial for the country as a whole, but is at 
the same time a prerogative of the political left. When it comes to arguments referring to public 
deficits or budgetary targets that the government must meet (Appendix: rows 3.1-3.14), instead, 
the room for partisan discourse becomes smaller. In our analysis, therefore, these justifications 
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constitute the indicator that the government is profiling itself as ‘responsible’. The following 
excerpts from respectively the 2013 and 2016 budget speeches are clear examples of these 
justifications: 
- For 2014, the objective of our nominal deficit target will be 3.6%, again in line with our 
European commitments. (Pierre Moscovici, 15 October 2013) 
- this budget envisages a reduction of the deficit to 2.7% next year, after 3.3% this year. This return 
below the threshold of 3% will allow – some will say "finally" – public debt to stabilize and even 
to fall slightly to 96% of GDP. (Michel Sapin, 18 October 2016) 
These justifications, contrary to the ‘responsive’ ones, do not reveal the political preferences of 
the government but simply report the duties it is expected to fulfil. These duties, we will argue, 
may have important repercussions for how the government holds itself accountable for its actions. 
In the following section, we will present how the budget speeches of the different governments 
feature different shares of the different justification categories, before focusing more specifically 
on the ‘responsible’ justifications in section 5.  
 
4. Results: The balance between responsive and responsible justifications 
Table 1 reports the percentages per presidency for the responsive, economy-related and responsible 
justifications. For the first category, we observe a 6% decline between the Mitterrand and Hollande 
presidencies. In parallel, and in line with Mair’s argument, we observe that the ‘responsible’ 
justifications have almost doubled. The arguments referring to the economy, in turn, are clearly 
the most dominant category of justifications in both time-periods (about 50%). These justifications 
contain specific overtime differences, as the Mitterrand governments were mainly concerned with 
the levels of inflation and re-balancing the trade-deficits, whereas under Hollande the minister of 
economy and finance is more concerned with the investment climate and the competitiveness of 
the economy (see Appendix, rows 2.10, 2.11, 2.14 and 2.16).  
[  Table 1  ] 
The discourses of the two time-periods thus share the characteristic of being dominated by 
references to economic indicators, yet they differ substantially when it comes to the question how 
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the latter are related to institutional budgetary rules. The overtime difference in the prominence of 
responsible justifications, in fact, is consistently present in the yearly budget presentations. Figure 
4 illustrates these patterns, with the columns representing the total percentage of justifications 
collected per budget speech, and the different shades indicating the share of the corresponding 
justification categories. As can be observed, in each budget speech the Hollande governments 
consistently feature more ‘responsible’ justifications than the Mitterrand governments, with the 
exception of the second budget speech of the two office terms, wherein the levels are relatively 
equal. While under Mitterrand the non-partisan justifications are almost exclusively about the state 
and the performance of the economy, under Hollande these also feature a considerable amount of 
references to public deficits and institutional commitments. 
[   Figure 4 about here   ] 
Another pattern emerging from the Figure 4, is how the yearly share of responsive justifications 
tends to follow the logics of the business cycle theory, according to which governments – and in 
particular left wing governments – generally pursue expansionary policies in the proximity of 
elections (Nordhaus 1975; Potrafke 2012). In both cases, responsive arguments tend to be more 
dominant in proximity of elections, whereas responsible justifications are used more in the central 
part of the office term. This is particularly true for the Hollande case, wherein for the first and fifth 
budget speeches we observe the larges shares of responsive justifications, and observe that 
responsible justifications register their highest peak in the third year in office. For the Mitterrand 
governments, instead, we observe that the highest peak of responsive arguments appears in the 
first budget speech, and that the share remains relatively constant in the subsequent years. The 
share of responsible justifications, in parallel, remains relatively small throughout the whole office 
term.  
The parallelisms between the political business cycle theory and the yearly shares of responsive 
justifications suggest that there is a connection between policies and justifications. When taking 
into account the associations between justifications and the policy-types to which these refer, we 
do find confirmation of this idea. Responsive justifications are overall clearly associated with 
expansive policies, and are almost never used for restrictive policies. Responsible arguments, in 
turn, are mostly used for restrictive policies, and rarely appear when the minister presents increases 
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in public expenditure or taxation. Table 2 reports the percentages per yearly budget speech, per 
time period and for the total justifications gathered. 
[  Table 2 about here  ] 
The association between policy-types and justifications allows us to make sense of the respective 
shares of responsive and responsible justifications. In both periods under study, for instance, the 
first budget speech (from 1981 and 2012) features relatively less responsible justifications than the 
speeches from the subsequent years of the office term. Restrictive policies, in parallel, are also 
much less referred to in these two budget speeches, reflecting the fact that at the beginning of both 
office terms the government tried to propose a more expansive policy approach that had to be 
reversed from the second year onwards. Under Mitterrand, however, the accent on the expansive 
policy course in the first part of the office term is much stronger than under Hollande. Under the 
latter instead, the institutional commitment to reduce public deficits considerably influenced the 
government’s policy approach also in the first part of the office term. 
In the subsequent years, both governments are forced to stick to policies that are more restrictive. 
In the case of Mitterrand, there is a clear U-turn in the policies presented, as references to expansive 
measures almost disappear in the 1983 and 1985 budget speeches, while between 1982 and 1984 
– the years of the famous tournant de la rigueur – restrictive measures become increasingly 
prominent. Nonetheless, these measures are mainly justified in relation to developments in the 
economy (e.g. Appendix rows 2.2; 2.6; 2.10; 2.14; 2.19), and are only rarely referred to with 
references to budgetary rules. Under Hollande, instead, both restrictive measures and responsible 
justifications are much more present during all stages of the office term, suggesting that the policy 
course of the cabinet is much more influenced by pre-existing institutional rules.  
Moreover, in the last speech during the Hollande presidency, the share of responsible justifications 
is also considerably high in the last speech, at the same time when the government increases its 
responsive arguments - presumably to win back the sympathy of party-supporters. In parallel, in 
the same speech the arguments about the economy are reduced to a remarkably low level. Instead, 
the minister focuses more on the efforts to keep public finances sustainable while maintaining a 
certain level of social cohesion. The following passage is an example of how, in the last budget 
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speech, the government tries to profile itself as both committed to reduce public deficits as well as 
sensitive to the functioning of France’s social model: 
- I repeat it once more here: the only credible and responsible budgetary strategy is the one we 
propose today to implement in the continuity [of previous measures]. It is the one that consists in a 
stable and durable control of public spending that allows for a gradual reduction of the deficit 
and taxes while modernizing our social model. (Michel Sapin, 18 October 2016) 
 
This passage serves as a justification for the overall measures presented in the budget, and features 
a combination of responsible (“gradually reduce public deficits”) and social-democratic 
(“modernise our social model”) justifications. The restrictive measures pursued by the government 
are thereby presented as mutually compatible with the more social-oriented commitments of the 
Parti Socialiste. 
As already discussed in our and other related studies (Damhuis and Karremans 2017; Huber and 
Stephens 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015), the restrictive policy-attitude emerging from the 
justifications is for a considerable extent in line with the post-industrial ideological profile of the 
Parti Socialiste. However, the characteristics of the responsible justifications found in the budget 
speeches also reveal another side of this same story. In the justifications of the Mitterrand 
governments from 1982 onwards, in fact, the will to pursue expansive policies tends to be paired 
up with the bitter recognition that the constraints are too big and that the government must follow 
another policy course. Under the Hollande presidency, instead, the appropriateness of moving 
within the boundaries posed by the external constraints does not seem to be a matter of discussion. 
In other words, in the 1980s the PS seemed to stumble upon the constraints posed by the 
surrounding economic context. In the 2010s, instead, the constraints are pre-institutionalized, as 
international norms and procedures guide the responsible behaviour of governments, inducing 
them to pursue reductions of expenditure and taxation. In the following section we will provide 
further qualitative evidence of this important overtime difference. 
 
5. The growing importance of institutional constraints 
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The justifications of the Mitterrand and Hollande governments do not only feature differences in 
the shares of responsible justifications, but also in the more specific content thereof. While during 
the Mitterrand period these justifications mainly contain general references to the state of public 
finances (Appendix: rows 3.1-3.3), the justifications of the Hollande governments display much 
more concrete references to the commitment of reducing public deficits (Appendix, rows: 3.4 and 
3.5) and to the international rules to which the governments is expected to comply (Appendix: 
rows 3.6-3.14). Figure 5 illustrates these differences. 
 
[  Figure 5 about here  ] 
 
The horizontal columns indicate the percentage of responsible justifications referring to 
respectively the general state of public finances, the commitment to reduce public deficits and the 
international institutional rules in this regard. As can be observed, the responsible justifications 
are almost exclusively about the first sub-category during the Mitterrand period, whereas 
references to concrete budgetary rules and objectives are much more frequent during the Hollande 
years. These differences are largely related to the way in which the governments profiled their 
budgetary responsibilities. 
In 1983, for instance, the PS-led government took full credit for the restrictive policy tournant it 
implemented, justifying it with the argument that in the given economic circumstances, this was 
the only and best policy solution, and comparing its action with that of other countries. The 
following passage is an excerpt from that year’s budget speech: 
- It is a given fact and I do not see why, by what miracle, the small French would escape the 
constraints imposed on the whole of Europe. In order to better situate our strengths and 
weaknesses, it is interesting to compare ourselves with five other European countries: the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. It shows 
that we are fifth for inflation, (..) and sixth for the deficit of the balance of payments; (..). On the 
other hand, for the proportions of the budget deficit relative to the national product, we are the 
second ones, as well as for the cumulated economic growth over two years, even if our results are 
not very strong; and, when it comes to the fight against unemployment (..) we are the first. These 
are the strengths and weaknesses of the French economy. If I have allowed myself to make these 
comparisons, it is, first of all, because they justify the policy of rigor that we have implemented 
after others, or at the same time as others. (Jacques Delors, 19 October 1983) 
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The restrictive policy course is justified in light of the developments in the international economy 
and in comparison with the policies of neighbouring countries. The attitude of the government is 
thus responsible but relatively autonomous, in the sense that it takes credit for the decisions on the 
budget and acts as the institution in charge of the public finances. In other words, it profiles itself 
as the public authority in charge of the decisions surrounding public finance. Such responsibility 
is taken even when it has to justify a 3% limit to budget deficits, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
- A few days ago, the President of the Republic, speaking to the French population, used two terms 
that symbolize our whole project: "resist" and "conquer". That is what it is all about. Resisting on 
all sides in the international crisis we are facing. Resisting public finances by saying that the 
deficit will not exceed 3 percent of the national wealth. (Laurent Fabius, 27 October 1982) 
 
The main driver behind the restrictive policies of the 1980s are thus developments in the 
international economy, to which the government autonomously decides to respond by keeping 
public deficits under control. The institutional duties, therefore, still stem from decisions and rules 
taken at the national level. 
Under the Hollande presidency, instead, the discourse portrays the minister as a sort of a 
spokesperson in a web of international institutions (Appendix: rows 3.11-3.14). The following two 
passages from the 2013 budget speech, for instance, serve as a justification for different reductions 
in public expenditures. 
The consolidation of public accounts must continue at a sustained pace, as an economy that is in 
debt is an economy that is weakening, due to rising interest rates, and eventually ends up 
degrading. What we want is a credible France, a France that has credit. I can assure you that, 
at the World Bank and IMF General Assemblies, our commitment to these principles is very 
much appreciated – indeed, we got credit for it. (Pierre Moscovici, 15 October 2013) 
 
- The structural effort on which our dialogue with the European Commission is now based, 
within the framework of its prerogatives, is extremely important: it reached 1.7 percentage points 
of GDP and has never been that high, after 1.3 points in 2012. 
For 2014, our nominal deficit target will be 3.6%, again in line with our European 
commitments. The structural effort, on the other hand, will represent 0.9 percentage points of 
GDP, which is essentially unchanged from the stability program transmitted to the European 
Commission in spring. (Pierre Moscovici, 15 October 2013) 
 
The consolidation of public finances is no longer solely based on developments in the economy, 
but is justified as being in line with the guidelines of international credit institutions such as the 
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World Bank and the IMF. Similarly, the reduction of budget deficits is not presented as an 
autonomous decision of the cabinet, but rather as the consequence of European agreements and 
the guidelines of the European Commission. By referring to authorities other than the French 
president or the national government, the minister thus reassures the audience that the decisions 
have been taken ‘responsibly’. 
The picture emerging from the qualitative comparison of the justifications is that governments in 
1980s were already strongly constrained, but were confronted with these constraints first-hand. 
From the budget speeches, the government claims to have a relatively larger autonomy in deciding 
its policy course, and thereby to decide to either act ‘irresponsibly’ or to adapt its action to the 
given circumstances. In the 2010s, instead, the international institutional rules surrounding the 
government’s action seem to preventively withhold it from ‘irresponsible’ behaviour and organize 
its action according to its responsibility towards the public finances. Whereas the constraints 
derived directly from the (international) economy in the 1980s, they tend to take of international 
norms and procedures to which the government is expected to adhere in the 2010s.  
In this sense, we find corroboration for Mair’s argument that the mounting institutional duties are 
putting more pressure on governments to act responsibly. The association between the responsible 
justifications and restrictive policies, in turn, provide evidence for how European guidelines may 
indeed prevent governments from pursuing expansive policies (Smith 2006). The blame shifting 
strategies of governments, in turn, are likely to affect how parties connect citizens’ preferences to 
political institutions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In his latest contributions, Peter Mair (2013; 2014) argued that governments today are more 
constrained than in the past, particularly because of the growing interference with national politics 
of supra- or international institutions such as the EU or the IMF. In view of his arguments, this 
paper focused on the policy justifications referring to institutional constraints for contemporary 
and past French center-left governments facing economic downturns. Our findings indicate that 
both under Mitterrand and under Hollande presidencies the external constraints forced 
governments to pursue a more restrictive policy course, and thereby to pay more attention to the 
sustainability of public finances. The overtime difference, however, is that, while in the 1980s the 
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justifications for the restrictive policy course solely referred to national priorities, in the 
contemporary justifications there are considerably more references to how the restrictive policy-
course is related to supranational budgetary rules.  
When linking these insights to the overtime differences in the representativeness of the Parti 
Socialiste (Damhuis and Karremans 2017), a picture emerges wherein:  
1) the responsiveness of the Parti Socialiste has shifted from being specifically attentive to the 
demands of low-income groups to speaking more on behalf of the middle classes and society-as-
a-whole - a transition that is accompanied by a replacement of traditional welfare expenditure with 
social investment policies (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2015).  
2) the responsibility of PS-led governments has shifted from advocating national budgetary 
priorities to emphasizing the compliance with international budgetary rules.  
This results in a growing dispersion of political authority, wherein national governments are no 
longer the sole main responsible institution for the budget, but wherein this responsibly is 
increasingly shared with inter- and supranational institutions (Genschel and Zangl 2014; Katz 
2014; Rose 2014). The findings presented in this paper speak in particular to this second 
development, suggesting that governments today are more constrained than in the past in the 
pursuit of their favoured fiscal paths. These findings, however, need to be validated against a wider 
set of cases. 
The extension of this type of overtime comparisons, in turn, needs to be applied to governments 
with similar partisan composition and facing relatively similar economic circumstances. As 
budgetary discourse can be subject to many influences, it is important to keep many factors 
constant in order to carry out this type of comparisons. Following this reasoning, a possible further 
comparison could be between the Brown (2007-2010) and the Callaghan (1976-1978) Labour 
ministries in Britain. In order to extend the study to the center-right, in turn, other possible 
comparisons could be between the first Cameron (2010-2015) and the first Thatcher (1979-1983) 
ministries in Britain, or the between first Rutte cabinet (2010-2012) and the first years of the 
Lubbers administration during the 1980s in the Netherlands. Such an extension of the comparisons 
would significantly enlarge the number of comparable overtime justifications in European 
democracies, which would in turn allow further testing the validity of our findings.  
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The further testing of these findings would in turn deepen our understanding of the changing nature 
of the accountability stage of the democratic cycle. In particular, it would shed light on the extent 
to which – under the current European economic governance framework – governments have the 
space to profile themselves as representatives of distinct sets of socio-economic policy-
preferences. From our comparison of the Hollande and Mitterrand governments, we find this space 
to be restricted, as supranational rules and expertise appear to play an ever more prominent role in 
the legitimation of budgetary policies. As the ‘changing face of responsibility’, that we have 
identified, relates to European budgetary rules to which all EU member states are subject, we 
believe that this overtime variation will also be traceable in other European countries. 
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Table 1 Share of justification categories under Mitterrand and Hollande governments (in 
%) 
 
Justification category 
Mitterrand 
governments 
Hollande 
governments 
Responsive justifications 35.1 29.2 
General functioning of economy 51.5 46.1 
Responsible justifications 13.4 24.7 
Total 100 100 
N 464 476 
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Table 2 Evolution of the share of policy types per justification category under Mitterrand 
and Hollande governments per year and per period (in %) 
 
 Responsive Economy Responsible 
Year Expansive General Restrictive Expansive General Restrictive Expansive General Restrictive 
1981 28.4 18.9 1.1 24.2 23.2 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 
1982 16.7 11.1 3.7 1.9 42.6 3.7 0.0 5.6 14.8 
1983 5.0 15.7 4.1 4.1 53.7 5.8 0.0 2.5 9.1 
1984 18.4 20.4 2.0 5.1 31.6 8.2 1.0 2.0 11.2 
1985 2.2 28.9 1.1 0.0 51.1 7.8 0.0 8.9 0.0 
          
2012 6.0 18.7 6.0 2.4 39.2 5.4 0.0 10.8 11.4 
2013 4.0 14.9 4.0 11.9 49.5 2.0 1.0 3.0 9.9 
2014 4.7 1.2 9.3 5.8 37.2 5.8 1.2 18.6 16.3 
2015 7.5 10.4 17.9 1.5 29.9 10.4 0.0 4.5 17.9 
2016 14.6 18.8 22.9 2.1 14.6 0.0 0.0 4.2 22.9 
          
Period          
1981-1985 13.5 19.4 2.4 7.4 40.8 5.2 0.2 4.4 6.6 
2012-2016 6.4 13.5 9.6 4.9 37.2 4.9 0.4 9.0 14.1 
          
Total 9.9 16.4 6.0 6.2 39.0 5.1 0.3 6.7 10.4 
    The bold values in Table 2 refer to the most frequent policy category per year. 
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Figure 1 The evolution of the integration of France within the European economic and monetary 
Union from 1957 to 2015 
 
Source: European Index of Institutional Integration (Dorrucci et al. 2015). Note: cumulative scores calculated 
in January for each year.  
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Figure 2 France government debt to GDP (%) 
 
Source: TradingEconomics.com, Insée 
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Figure 3 Economic growth rates during the office term (% of GDP) 
 
Source: World bank data: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2016&locations=FR&start=1980 
Accessed on 23 November 2017 
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Figure 4 Evolution of justifications types per year under Mitterrand and Hollande governments 
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Appendix 1 Coded justifications per year and type of policy 
  
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Justification category E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R E G R 
1. Responsive 
                              
1.1 Reduce inequality  14 6 
 
2 2 
 
3 7 
 
2 11 1 1 8 
 
2 14 3 1 5 
 
1 
      
2 3 
1.2 Low-income classes 1 
  
3 
 
1 
 
3 2 2 3 
   
1 1 3 
  
1 2 
 
1 2 
  
1 
 
2 2 
1.3 Middle classes  
                
1 
  
1 1 
  
2 
 
1 6 
 
2 2 
1.4 Unemployed 1 
        
1 1 
 
1 3 
    
1 
        
1 
  
1.4 Employees 1 1 1 1 
    
2 
 
1 
               
1 
   
1.5 Families 1 
  
1 
  
2 
 
1 1 
     
1 
   
1 
      
1 
   
1.6 Young citizens 1 
      
2 
 
1 1 
    
1 
  
1 
  
1 
  
1 
     
1.7 Elderly 1 
    
1 
   
2 
          
1 
     
1 
  
3 
1.8 General needs of social groups (other) 
                
1 
             
1.9 Future generations (other) 
                 
1 
            
1.10 Handicapped adults (other) 
         
1 
                    
1.11 Welfare recipients (other) 
       
1 
                      
1.12 Small business owners and shopkeepers (other)  
  
1 
                          
1.13 Farmers (other) 1 
            
1 
                
1.14 People who started working at young age (other)  
              
1 
              
1.15 People living in tense neighbourhoods (other) 
               
1 
              
1.16 Car users (other) 1 
                             
1.17 General social harmony  
 
2 
     
2 
     
7 
  
2 1 
 
1 
       
3 1 
 
1.20 Income/spending power  
 
1 
 
1 
     
1 2 1 
 
1 
  
2 4 
 
5 
   
3 
  
2 
 
1 1 
1.21 Life conditions  
                 
1 
            
1.22 Public administration and public services 1 1 
       
1 
     
1 
       
1 
   
1 1 
 
1.23 Environment protection 
                
1 
 
1 
      
1 
    
1.24 Health 1 
        
1 
                    
1.25 Security 1 1 
       
1 
   
2 
       
1 
  
2 
  
1 
  
1.26 Education (incl. research) 1 
   
2 
 
1 
  
4 
   
3 
          
1 
  
1 
  
1.27 Formation/extra training 
       
2 
  
1 
  
1 
       
1 
  
1 
     
1.28 Culture 1 
                        
1 
    
1.29 Fight against financial speculation  
 
1 
             
1 1 
             
1.30 Fight against austerity 
 
5 
             
1 5 
             
1.31 Fight against fraud 
    
2 
              
1 
     
3 
    
                               
2. Economy 
                              
2.1 Economic context general   1     2     3 1   2     7           4     4 1   2     1   
2.2 Economic crisis/conjuncture   1     3 1 1 5     2           3           5               
2.3 Econ. heritage previous gov.   1     1     1     1           1     2           2     1   
2.4 Inflation                           1                 4 1   1         
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2.5 Structural economic changes   1     2     2     1                             1         
2.6 International economic context   2     2      7 3   5            2  1      1    1                
2.7 Economic performance general 5 1     1 1   2   1 1 1   4     6 2   5               1     
2.8 Economic growth  4 2           5           3 1 2 20 2 2 10     6 1   7         
2.9 Fight unemployment 4 5     1   1 3   1 2     6     8   3 9   2 4 1   4     2   
2.10 Competitiveness         1     10     4     3     6 3 3 9     1 1   1     2   
2.11 Balance of trade 1 2     2   1 3     5 1   1     4                           
2.12 Economic activity 1 1     1     1       2               1     3               
2.13 Global growth                                 4                           
2.14 Reduce inflation 1 2     2     7 2   3     5                                 
2.15 Innovation               1                 3   1 1                     
2.16 Investment (climate) 2       1   1 2   1       2 2 1 2 1 2 4 1 1 2     1     1   
2.17 Devaluation               1                                             
2.18 Flexibility in economy               2     1     2                                 
2.19 Productivity               4 1   1 2     1   1     3                     
2.20 Deflation                       1                     1               
2.21 Efficiency of industry                     2     1                                 
2.22 Improve economic climate of companies                               1 1   1                       
2.23 Consumption 1                         1     1                           
2.24 Modernisation         3           1     4     1         1                 
2.25 Industry more dynamic         1                                                   
2.26 Employment more dynamic                                       1                     
2.27 Prepare future               5                       1   1 1               
2.28 Make Paris a financial center                           3 3                               
2.29 Help entreprises 2     1           2   1         1               1 1 3                                      
3. Responible 
                              
3.1 Public finance general    4     2 3   2 9 1   8         3 8     1   1 8           8 
3.2 Credibility general                           1     1     1                     
3.3Room for government expenditure  3 3         1 1           3     1                           
3.4 Reduce debt                 2               3 4           1     9     2 
3.5 Control Budget deficit         1 3           3         2 5     5     3     4     1 
3.6 Credibility vis-à-vis Europeans                            3                 2 1   2     1   
3.7 Credibility extern Observers                     1               1   1     1   2         
3.8 External expertise as justification                     1     1           1     3     2          
3.9 There is no alternative           2                       1                         
3.10 Restricted room-for-manoeuver                                       1                     
3.11 Engagements EU                                 3 1     2 1 4               
3.12 Justification IMF                                             2     1         
3.13 European integration               1                 5       1   1       1   1   
3.14 Pressure Eurozone                           3     1           3               
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Residual 
                              
International solidarity 1 
      
2 
        
1 
       
2 1 
    
National sovereignty    1             1   1           2 1   1             1   1   
Keep state authority                     1                                     
 
National interest   1                                                       
 
TOTAL 97 54 122 100 90 169 102 86 68 49 
Note: Column ‘E’ refers to Expansive policy; ‘G’ to General policy; ‘R’ to Restrictive policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
